insider brief
Russia is preparing to formally certify the first quantum key distribution (QKD) system developed by QRate. This is an important pre-commercial step to ensure protection from known security loopholes and attacks. This study details the evaluation and testing of QRate’s fiber optic system using the BB84 protocol with decoy conditions, identifies several hardware vulnerabilities such as detector attacks, and implements countermeasures such as photocurrent measurements. I am proposing it. The certification process follows Russia’s national cryptographic standards and highlights the growing importance of QKD technology in securing sensitive communications in a geopolitical context.
One of Russia’s first certified Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) systems is ready to receive formal certification to ensure resilience against known security loopholes and attacks, pre-commercialization. This is an important step.
In a study on arXiv, a Russian-led international research team reports that they conducted a series of tests to prepare a fiber-optic QKD system for this certification process and concluded that the system is secure. This QKD system appears to be domestically produced and could be used to securely exchange cryptographic keys between two parties using the principles of quantum mechanics. This technology ensures that any attempt to eavesdrop on key transmissions is detected, providing an unprecedented level of security for sensitive communications such as financial transactions and government communications.
This study focused on preparing the QKD system for formal certification by the Russian company QRate. The system is designed to transmit quantum keys with a high level of security over optical fiber using the BB84 protocol with a decoy state described below. This study provides a detailed assessment of the system, focusing on identifying potential vulnerabilities and measures needed to close security loopholes.
According to the paper, certification of QKD systems is an important step in technology development, ensuring resistance to known attacks and enabling broader deployment. Although the international standard for QKD is still evolving, QRate’s system has undergone intense scrutiny in preparation for Russia’s own certification process.
The team wrote: “Preparing a QKD system for certification includes (i) documenting the system with the necessary details for analysis, and patching the security loopholes discovered by Sajeed et al. (2021); ), suggests requirements for future certification exams. These four steps must be completed by the QKD system developer and may require the involvement of an external security analysis team. , taking advantage of the latest developments in countermeasures and security certifications and implementing them against QRate’s commercial systems.”
Although Russian encryption standards are classified, the findings and processes outlined in this paper also provide a glimpse into these standards and the challenges faced in securing these advanced cryptographic systems. provides useful insights about
QRate system and BB84 protocol
QRate’s QKD system employs a preparation and measurement scheme based on the BB84 protocol with decoy states. This is a well-established quantum key distribution method that is widely considered to be secure. The system sends polarized pulses of light through optical fibers to securely share cryptographic keys between two parties, called Alice and Bob, while preventing a potential eavesdropper, called Eve, from accessing the information.
The study explains that the BB84 protocol uses a decoy state, a method of detecting attempts to intercept or manipulate quantum keys, which makes the protocol particularly robust. In the QRate system, light pulses are encoded with information at a rate of 312.5 MHz, a remarkable speed that highlights its potential for real-world applications. However, even with this proven protocol, the study authors note that there are several potential vulnerabilities in the system’s hardware and optical components that could be exploited if not addressed. I’m doing it.
Identifying and addressing vulnerabilities
The researchers wrote that the QKD system’s authentication process does more than just check the encryption protocol. It also includes identifying hardware flaws that can open the door to attacks. The QRate system was found to have several potential vulnerabilities that could be exploited, including weaknesses in the single photon detector (SPD). SPD is important for detecting the quantum bits (qubits) used for transmission, but it can be vulnerable to attacks that manipulate the detection process.
The research team is also discussing “superlinear detector control.” This is a type of attack in which an eavesdropper overwhelms a system’s detectors with powerful light pulses, effectively blinding them and leaving them vulnerable. To prevent such attacks, they propose countermeasures such as photocurrent measurements to detect when the system is overloaded.
In addition to SPD vulnerabilities, systems can be exposed to “aftergate attacks” and “folding edge attacks.” Both of these attacks involve manipulating the timing of light pulses to exploit the system’s gating mechanism. Addressing these timing-related vulnerabilities is complex and requires precise engineering of detectors and quantum pulses.
Quantum key distribution system under evaluation (prototype built in 2021) with Alice and Bob cover removed.
Russian certification process
As with most cryptographic systems, authentication is essential to ensure the reliability and security of QKD systems. However, the certification process for quantum technology remains largely classified in Russia. The study notes that although the system has undergone rigorous internal analysis, final certification will be based on Russia’s national cryptographic standards, which are not publicly available.
Nevertheless, this study provides a broad overview of how QRate prepares its certification system and provides insight into the types of tests and assessments required. Systems should be tested for various optical vulnerabilities, detector mismatches, and potential side-channel attacks (where an attacker may obtain information indirectly through flaws in the system implementation).
To reduce risk, QRate has implemented several hardware and software measures. For example, the company designed the system to be resistant to detector-blinding attacks, a common vulnerability in QKD systems. The system’s ability to handle detector timing mismatches has also been enhanced.
National importance of QKD
This study suggests that QRate’s system is being developed in a geopolitical context where certification of QKD systems is becoming a matter of national importance. While international standards for quantum key distribution are still evolving, Russia is moving forward with its own certification process. This comes amid growing concerns about the security of the nation’s communications infrastructure, especially as quantum computing threatens to defeat traditional encryption methods in the future.
Quantum key distribution is considered an important technology for securing communications, not only for individuals and businesses, but also for governments. Chinese scientists representing this team have already made significant progress in introducing QKD into telecommunications networks, and Russia appears poised to develop a domestic QKD system like QRate.
The research institutions involved include scientists from Russia, China, Thailand, Spain and Canada. Russia: Russian Quantum Center, Skolkovo. National University of Sciences and Technology NTI Quantum Communication Center MISiS; Russian Academy of Sciences, Steklov Institute of Mathematics. Q rate; Department of Economics, National Research University of Spain: Vigo Quantum Communication Center, University of Vigo. atlanTtic Research Center, University of Vigo, Thailand: Department of Physics, Faculty of Science, Mahidol University. Quantum Technology Foundation, Bangkok, Canada: University of Waterloo Institute for Quantum Computing. Faculty of Physics and Astronomy, University of Waterloo China: National University of Defense Technology Institute of Quantum Information and State Key Laboratory of High Performance Computing
Although not formally labeled in the paper, QKD systems appear to be primarily manufactured domestically. However, the team’s global composition suggests it would benefit from at least some international expertise.
For a deeper, more technical look at the research, including details on the list of tests implemented by the team, which we didn’t have space to cover in this overview article, please see the arXiv paper.
